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ELISE K. WIRTSCHAFTER
SOCIAL CATEGORIES 
IN RUSSIAN IMPERIAL HISTORY
In the 1968 edition of Social Theory and Social Structure, Robert K. Merton writes
of middle-range sociological theories that they “consist of limited sets of
assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed
by empirical investigation […] The middle-range orientation involves the
specification of ignorance. Rather than pretend to knowledge where it is in fact
absent, it expressly recognizes what must still be learned in order to lay the
foundation for still more knowledge. It does not assume to be equal to the task of
providing theoretical solutions to all the urgent practical problems of the day but
addresses itself to those problems that might now be clarified in the light of
available knowledge.”1 Although Merton’s statement refers to applied sociological
research, the issue it highlights resonates with historians. In the effort to reconstruct
past events, historians are by nature inclined to follow a middle way — a middle
way between what current theoretical or intellectual fashion tells us we should want
to know and what the documentary source base allows us to know.
Michael Confino’s essay on “the soslovie (estate) paradigm” leads readers to the
sort of “middle-range” conclusion advocated by Merton. Reflecting upon roughly a
century of social discourse and historiographic debate, Confino reminds historians
of how difficult it can be to find the appropriate vocabulary for describing the social
arrangements of old regime Russia. Like almost every historian of Russia, Confino
thinks within the conceptual apparatus of European history. Working with the
language of estate (état) and class, he traces the long-term development of Russian
society with reference to Muscovite ranks (chiny), Petrine service estates (sosloviia
or sostoianiia), and late imperial classes. This is to be expected, given that the
established historiography is largely the product of how Russian elites, and
consequently later generations of historians, understood these categories. But as
Confino also makes clear, the categories and concepts derived from European
1. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), 68-69.
Dans cet essai, Elise K. Wirtschafter fait écho à celui de Michael Confino sur les soslovija (états)
commme système de classification sociojuridique paru dans le numéro précédent (49/4). Ceux qui
désireraient s’associer à cette discussion, la prolonger et l’élargir, sont invités à soumettre leurs
propositions. En outre, un numéro thématique « Classifications sociales et juridiques dans l’Empire
russe (du XVIIe à 1917) » est en cours de préparation. (NdlR)
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history are never quite adequate when applied to the Russian case. Indeed, the
“European” categories that Russian historians tend to accept as unproblematic do
not even make sense for all of Europe. Still, if scholars are to have a meaningful
conversation about Russia, Russia in Europe, Europe, or any particular European
country, they need to adopt terminology that, while not exactly precise, is more or
less understandable from a variety of historical perspectives. In this spirit, Confino
notes that the prerevolutionary historian V.O. Kliuchevskii used the term soslovie
to mean not état but social category. Kliuchevskii, Confino insists, would not have
employed a term “that was opposed to common usage”; he would not have risked
being “misunderstood by his [Russian] readers and listeners.” So although the
language of soslovie may not be fully satisfactory from the viewpoint of recent
scholarship, it “is too well established in the historians’ [sic] vocabulary to be
abandoned at this late date.”2 The same can be said of chin and class. 
If for now historians must accept the language of soslovie as the primary
language of Russian social history, this does not mean that better solutions to open
questions will not eventually be found. Michael Confino’s attention to “open
questions,” his eagerness to find “a better solution,” places him squarely in the
methodological middle way, in that shifting ground between what historians would
like to know and what they are able to know based on the sources at hand. Indeed,
because of the mass illiteracy that persisted for much of the history of Imperial
Russia, social historians have been forced to rely on the legal-administrative
records of the bureaucracy and/or the letters, memoirs, scholarship, literary works,
and journalistic accounts of the educated classes. For historians, sources are
everything, and while the collapse of the Soviet Union has produced greater
archival access, the parish, estate, and local government records that promise to
provide new information are often fragmentary and geographically limited. Still, as
researchers continue to investigate these records, and as they apply innovative
theoretical perspectives such as those being developed in environmental and
regional history, they are likely to discover new answers to longstanding problems.
This essay assumes that better solutions will indeed be forthcoming, but it remains
within the existing historiography based on official and elite sources. Sensitive to
the limits imposed by these sources, the essay seeks to elucidate what they make
knowable.
Social Categories and Social History
In its heyday the “new social history” of the 1960s to 1980s significantly broadened
the knowledge base available to scholars. Social historians sought among other things
to write “history from below,” the history of laboring people as opposed to the history
of political and intellectual elites. Grounded in geography, demography, and
2. Michael Confino, “The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm: Reflections on Some Open Questions,”
Cahiers du Monde russe, 49, 4 (December 2008): 690, 699.
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economics, history from below also included the history of mentality or social
consciousness — the history of how ordinary people understood the social
relationships, material conditions, everyday routines, and political arrangements that
defined their lives. Over time, work in Russian archives taught historians that the
effort to understand the social consciousness of laboring people — people who rarely
expressed themselves in writing — had produced valuable information about their
relationships to legal-administrative institutions but scant knowledge of their actual
thoughts and feelings. Subsequent research in the history of concepts
(Begriffsgeschichte) showed that the meanings and definitions of seemingly familiar
social categories could be variable even in a single context, suggesting that the
relationships they embodied might also be changeable and indeterminate. From these
“discoveries” historians concluded that in the search for social consciousness — for
what people thought about the social relationships of everyday life — they had
analyzed the official conceptualization rather than the lived experience of “society.”3
Once scholars understood that government records and other elite sources
documented not the full range of social life but the official social order, it became
necessary to ask what could be learned from the study of legally defined social
categories. What did the essentially official categories reveal about the development
of Russian society?
Before addressing this question, it is important to note that the legally defined
categories represented just one type of social classification found in Imperial
Russia. Socioeconomic and sociocultural categories also developed. Although the
legal categories dominate the archival record, and although the specific categories
that fall under one or another rubric — legal, socioeconomic, or sociocultural —
frequently overlapped and intersected, these broad classifications always should be
kept in mind. They admit the full range of intellectual conceptions of society found
in the historiography and available documentation, and they correspond to the
developmental sources of social definition and delineation, the relative weight of
which changed depending on context and contiguity.4
The legal categories of Russian society defined the formal institutional
parameters of individual and collective life chances, including socioeconomic
relationships sanctioned or prescribed by law. Such life chances took the form of
civic rights, service obligations and opportunities, access to education, inheritance
and property rights, rights to trade, and rights of production. Legal categories were
the product of state and empire building, which encompassed all types of service,
government-sponsored schools, and the incorporation of ethnic and religious
minorities.
3. This understanding of Russian social history is presented in Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter,
From Serf to Russian Soldier (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990); idem, Structures of
Society: Imperial Russia’s “People of Various Ranks” (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Univ. Press,
1994); idem, Social Identity in Imperial Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 1997);
idem, Russia’s Age of Serfdom, 1649-1861 (Malden: Blackwell, 2008).
4. These developmental sources are discussed in Wirtschafter, Structures of Society.
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Socioeconomic categories arose from informal life chances: for example, the
need to make a living in specific historical circumstances. The socioeconomic
conception depended most directly on environmental conditions, material
resources, economic structures, and the organization of families and communities.
Socioeconomic categories grew out of spontaneous productive development and
relations of production, including illegal and extralegal economic activities such as
the unlawful exploitation of serf labor, the “free works” of the regimental economy,
and some forms of peasant trade.
Finally, sociocultural categories appeared in response to social and spiritual
needs and in order to legitimize power and authority relationships. These categories
developed both outside of officialdom and within the framework of state-sponsored
educational and artistic institutions. The sociocultural categories encompassed
collectivities such as obshchestvo (civil society of the educated), narod (the
people), and the intelligentsia. Areas of activity that generated sociocultural
categories included religion, the spread of literacy and education, the development
of a commercial press, popular culture, the evolution of customary law within
individual communities and in relation to statute law and government
administration, and the formation of a public or semipublic sphere represented by
self-sustaining literary, artistic, and scholarly elites and by cultural, professional,
religious, and secret societies.
When historians look at what social categories and definitions meant in
concrete historical circumstances — when they consider how specific categories
were applied, received, and recreated in government and society — it becomes
clear that the understanding and contours of the categories changed depending on
how, when, where, by whom, and for what purpose they were used. The resulting
patterns and dynamics of social definition indicate that whereas the legal,
socioeconomic, and sociocultural modes of categorization tended toward precise
delineation, the multiple meanings of individual categories remained contextual
and fundamentally indeterminate. For scholars, fluctuations in the meaning of the
categories raise interesting questions about standard categorical distinctions that
often appear in historical writings (this essay included) — distinctions such as
state and society, law and custom, elite and popular, conscious and spontaneous,
modern and traditional. The relationship between customary and statute law
illustrates the point. In the selection of recruits for the Russian army, popular
custom clearly preceded and to some extent determined legal formulations. At the
same time, it was state demand that forced local communities to develop
conscription practices in the first place. Legal culture in this arena did not, then,
consist of two separate spheres, the formal and the customary. It was instead a
messy interactive blending and clashing of official and local practices that
formed and operated only in relation to each other. Just as individual and
community conceptualizations of social relationships, including their own self-
definitions, represented accommodation or resistance to the social order, legally
defined social categories constituted not only compulsion but also compromise
with concrete historical conditions. 
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Social Categories as Social Process
Russian archives are filled with judicial cases that document how official social
categories operated in concrete circumstances. These cases encompass a broad
range of social phenomena, all of which illuminate the relationship of ordinary
people to official society: falsified identities, illegal enserfment, popular
disobedience and rebellion, peasant complaints against abusive landowners, and
soldiers’ complaints against negligent and cruel commanders.5 To illustrate the
relationships and interactions at work, it is worth describing a handful of cases. The
first concerns the illegal enserfment of a self-proclaimed soldier’s son and thus
illustrates the uncertainties of social definition caused by the demands of the
service state. The second case, a record of military service and disobedience by
soldiers, highlights the ability of Russian subjects to use judicial proceedings to
defend individual and collective interests. Finally, the last two cases deal with the
relationship between socioeconomic development and social categorization,
specifically with how economic relationships undermined official social
definitions. One case concerns the illegal ownership of serfs by non-nobles and the
other an apparent imposter claiming to be the adopted son of a Moscow townsman.
In all of these cases, the relationships and circumstances described seem confusing
and convoluted. Rest assured, however, that the messiness is indicative of actual
historical reality.
Throughout the Imperial period, military service played an important role both
in defining social boundaries and in creating opportunities to cross those
boundaries. Decades before the creation of the citizen army of revolutionary
France, the Russian empire built a military force based on mass conscription.
Dependent upon the institution of serfdom, this army dated from the reign of Tsar
Peter I (ruled 1682/1689-1725) and drew its recruits from social groups subject to
the Petrine capitation. Most recruits came from the state peasantry or serf
population, with a smattering from the urban laboring classes and various minority
communities. Service was for life, though in 1793 the government reduced the term
to 25 years, followed by a further reduction to 20 years in 1834. Universal
conscription did not come into play until 1874, after the 1861 emancipation of the
serfs, and only then did it become possible for the empire to maintain a body of
reserves ready for call up in time of war.
Serfdom imparted to Russian military service a distinctive set of features.
Before the emancipation of 1861, conscription brought “freedom” to hundreds of
thousands of laboring people. At the moment of induction, recruits became legally
free from the capitation and authority of the landowner or local community. Their
5. Examples of these cases are discussed in E.K. Wirtschafter, “Legal Identity and the
Possession of Serfs in Imperial Russia,” Journal of Modern History, 70/3 (September 1998):
561-587, and in the studies cited in note 3. On popular use of the courts, see also Jane Burbank,
Russian Peasants Go to Court: Legal Culture in the Countryside, 1905-1917 (Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 2004); Alessandro Stanziani, “Serf, slaves, or wage earners? The legal
status of labour in Russia from a comparative perspective, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth
century,” Journal of Global History, 3, 2 (July 2008): 183-202.
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wives and any children born to them (or their wives) after they entered active
service also became legally free. Ironically, this freedom usually meant not
personal liberty but greater social insecurity. Soldiers’ wives who left the village,
whether voluntarily or under compulsion, struggled to earn a living and find a place
in society. Soldiers’ daughters usually remained with their mothers or attended
state schools. Soldiers’ sons either entered military schools around age 7 or began
active service at age 18. As members of a legally free social category with access to
a modicum of education, soldiers’ children (soldatskie deti) enjoyed the possibility
of upward social mobility. Rarely did they achieve noble status, but soldier’s sons
could be found in the ranks of noncommissioned officers, in lesser administrative
posts, and in Russia’s proto-professions.
The illegitimate sons of soldiers’ wives also belonged to the category “soldiers’
children,” and they too were legally free and supposed to enter military service. In
practice, their status remained particularly ambiguous. They could be difficult to
identify, and landowners who supported them sometimes attained rights of
ownership. The uncertainties that arose are illustrated by a case from 1843 heard in
the Bronnitsy district court of Moscow province.6 A serf named Makei
Aleksandrov was brought before the court, accused of striking a peasant official
(starosta) and failing to extinguish a fire. Aleksandrov denied his serf origins,
claiming instead that he was Makei Filipov, the illegitimate son of a soldier’s wife,
a status that would have made him a legally free man. The court rejected the claim,
and after several peasants testified to Aleksandrov’s disorderly and negligent
conduct, he was sentenced to 50 blows with birches and returned to his master.
Aleksandrov denounced the judgment, and his case was forwarded to the Moscow
criminal chamber, which approved the lower court’s decision. Undeterred, in
September 1844, Aleksandrov petitioned the Moscow military governor-general,
who immediately took steps to corroborate the serf’s self-proclaimed free status.
Perhaps because the manpower needs of the tsarist army always took priority, the
governor-general’s office treated Aleksandrov’s assertions seriously. Provincial-
level authorities instructed their subordinates to investigate Aleksandrov’s origins
and ordered his master, Provincial Secretary Isakov, to present appropriate
documentation.
In Aleksandrov’s appeal to the governor-general, he claimed that his birth to the
soldier’s wife Nastas´ia Nikiforova could be verified in the parish registers of a
village in Bronnitsy district. To support this story, Aleksandrov also identified his
godparents, an older sister (also illegitimate) who lived on another estate, and
several additional relatives, including a son from a forced marriage. Aleksandrov
admitted to being registered to Isakov in the eighth revision, and during the judicial
proceedings, he continued to make quitrent payments. He insisted, however, that he
was a wrongfully condemned free man, prosecuted for his alleged crimes only after
initiating an emancipation suit. Clearly, Aleksandrov did not expect to receive fair
6. TGIAgM, (Tsentral´nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv goroda Moskvy), f. 16
(Kantseliariia Moskovskogo general-gubernatora), op. 13, d. 449.
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treatment at the hands of local officials. His master was himself an official, friendly
with members of the district court. In light of these unjust circumstances,
Aleksandrov requested the transfer of his case to another location and written
permission to live independently until the authorities reached a final decision.
These requests were denied, but district officials, under direct pressure from
superiors, continued to seek additional information from Aleksandrov’s registered
owner.
At this point the archival record falls silent, and it is not known if the governor-
general’s interest in the case produced additional information that confirmed or
negated the convicted serf’s story. Regardless of the outcome, the tribulations or
machinations of Makei Aleksandrov, self-defined as Filipov, demonstrate how
state building produced social insecurity and illegal enserfment and how in cases of
illegal enserfment the limited right to emancipation could become a means to
protect the empire’s lowliest subjects.
The ability of humble Russian subjects to use judicial institutions to defend their
needs is documented in numerous courts-martial from the decades preceding the
emancipation. In a case from 1857, 21 soldiers serving in the A°   land fortifications
went on trial for disobedience against their commander, Ensign Shchetinin.7 On
28 September 1856 Shchetinin had informed his men that supplies were low and
that provisions would be obtained from  A°   bo. The men agreed to use state funds to
provide for themselves until the provisions arrived and received money for food
through October 8. For the period October 7 to 14, they reportedly bought beef,
which was supposed to last until October 21. The defendants later testified that half
the meat was spoiled, but they also had received money to purchase meal and
potatoes.
On October 14 the expected supplies did not arrive, and the situation began to
deteriorate. The men received additional money on the fourteenth, but when they
requested payment on the fifteenth, Shchetinin told them they would have to wait.
For two days, the soldiers carried on with their normal duties. Then on the
seventeenth, a noncommissioned officer informed Shchetinin that the men of
Company No. 4 again had demanded money. Having run out of state funds,
Shchetinin distributed his own money for the fifteenth and sixteenth. He also
questioned the men of Company No. 4, who complained that they had nothing to
eat and already owed local residents money for the past two days. Shchetinin
ignored the claim, believing that the men did have access to food and that local
residents could wait until the supplies arrived to be reimbursed. He therefore
ordered the men back to work. A few men from Companies No. 5, 6, and 7 obeyed
the order, but 18 men from Company No. 4 refused and returned to their quarters.
Shchetinin then gave them more of his own money for the seventeenth. Meanwhile,
soldiers from other companies also began to complain and refuse to work. On
October 17, only the men of Company No. 7 and a handful of soldiers from
7. RGVIA (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv), f. 801 (Auditoriatskii
departament voennogo ministerstva), op. 73, d. 32.
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Company No. 6 complied with orders.8 Soon after this incident supplies arrived,
and Shchetinin took steps to restore his authority. On October 18, when the
commander tried to punish 3 “instigators,” the men of Company No. 4 refused to
allow the punishments. “They did not steal anything,” the soldiers insisted. “The
tsar did not order us to starve,” one gunner added. With that the entire company
walked off, and Shchetinin initiated a judicial process.
The military judicial authorities condemned the men of Company No. 4 on two
grounds. First, the testimony of other soldiers indicated that the men had sufficient
supplies of food. But Shchetinin had not actually inspected Company No. 4, which
was quartered at some distance, so it is possible that the men of Company No. 4
lacked supplies. Second, the authorities also agreed with Shchetinin that the men
could acquire food on credit from local inhabitants. Regardless, moreover, of the
soldiers’ actual condition, the lack of food and funds did not justify disobedience,
especially because the situation resulted from circumstances beyond Shchetinin’s
control. In general, when state supplies were unavailable, military units obtained
goods from local residents. Sometimes soldiers also earned money at outside work.
Still, if local residents actually had provided adequate food, why did Shchetinin
distribute his own money? The archival record does not answer this question.
More interesting than the problem with supplies is what the case reveals about
the soldiers’ social attitudes and expectations. It is noteworthy that the men of
Company No. 4 acted as a unit, that the authorities identified them as such, and that
the men of other companies followed their lead. The crime of Company No. 4
consisted of demanding money allotted by law to every soldier. The soldiers knew
that their commander was responsible for feeding them and thus refused to work
when they did not receive their daily allowance. They also shielded their comrades
from punishment: the soldiers had a right to the money and so did not consider their
fellow servicemen guilty or any punishment justified. Repeatedly, in the prereform
army, soldiers committed acts of disobedience when their rights were violated —
when their commanders abused them, neglected to provide for them, or punished
them unjustly.
The Russian government saw things differently. Disobedience could not be
tolerated, though if a commander’s negligence or abuse caused the disobedience,
he too would be punished along with his subordinates. Of course, the severity of the
punishment varied, depending on the crime and social status of the defendants. In
this case, Ensign Shchetinin faced two weeks under arrest for “inefficiency” in
provisioning his unit. By contrast, 18 men from Company No. 4 were found guilty
of “overt disobedience” and sentenced to run the gauntlet 2-4 times through 100
men, followed by 3-5 years of service in a convicts’ company. Four of the men were
judged medically unfit to undergo corporal punishment and so escaped that part of
their sentence. Several soldiers from Companies No. 5 and 6 faced milder
punishments, and two noncommissioned officers suffered demotion and transfer
8. Note that the facts of the cases are not always clear from the archival record. Here the details
regarding the events of October 17 seem muddled.
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for failing to ensure that their subordinates returned to work. Despite the harshness
of the punishments, the case illustrates how judicial proceedings afforded ordinary
soldiers a measure of protection. In theory and practice, military justice sanctioned
expectations of decent treatment and economic security.
In the two cases just discussed, Russian subjects used official social definitions,
the terms of military service, and established judicial procedures to protect and
defend their interests. In other cases, individuals manipulated social definitions and
openly violated legal prescriptions. The exploitation of serf labor by non-nobles
shows just how easy it could be to ignore official social boundaries. In a protracted
and complicated case spanning the years from 1827 to 1840, successive
administrative decisions and legislative enactments recorded the plight of 26 peasants
who claimed to be in the illegal possession of Ipat Koronovskii, a townsman from
Vitebsk province.9 The facts of the case documented a web of illegal relationships
resulting from debt, inheritance, bureaucratic corruption or incompetence, and blatant
disregard for the law. The lawsuit that finally decided the case began in 1827, but
local officials already had begun an investigation in 1816, after peasants complained
of cruel beatings and excessive workloads at the hands of Koronovskii. The
investigation revealed that in 1798 the father of Ipat, Lev Koronovskii, acquired 26
serfs from a noblewoman named Katerina Stupishina. Formal deeds registered the
peasants to State Councilor Nikolai Volkov. Then in 1799 Lev purchased additional
serfs from Stupishina, this time an entire estate with 265 serfs in Velizh district. This
sale too was certified in the name of a nobleman, Collegial Assessor Bykovskii. Legal
formalities notwithstanding, Lev proudly proclaimed his ownership by renaming the
estate L´vov.
Consistent with the façade of ownership, Lev Koronovskii repeatedly bought,
sold, and deeded serfs, as if he were a legitimate noble serf owner. In 1804 he sold 3
serfs to a merchant from Smolensk province, Semen Bagreev. In 1818 Bagreev
freed one of the serfs, a woman who received a certificate of emancipation from the
Velizh city police and subsequently married a local townsman. When Bagreev
died, his nephew inherited the remaining two serfs. A second transfer of serfs from
Lev occurred when his daughter Pelageia married a nobleman named Bykov and
received a dowry of 29 serfs from her father’s estate. Lev’s testament of 1810
granted her full control over the serfs, and a separate proxy (doverennost´)
registered with the Velizh city police authorized her to sell them. Any income
received from such a sale would count toward the repayment of a debt owed to
Pelageia by Collegial Assessor Bykovskii, the registered owner of the serfs.
After the death of Lev Koronovskii, his son Ipat became master of L´vov. Ipat
held no proxy from Bykovskii, but in 1811 he sold a male peasant to the townsman
Timofei Bagreev, presumably the nephew of the merchant Semen Bagreev. Once
again authorities in Velizh, this time the city magistracy, registered the transaction.
Collegial Secretary Radkevich subsequently purchased this peasant, and
9. RGIA (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv), f. 1149 (Departament zakonov
gosudarstvennogo soveta), op. 2, d. 20, l. 14-17ob.
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investigators also later discovered that the Koronovskiis had sold individual serfs to
two other nobles. Finally, in 1812 Ipat hired a steward to manage his estate, an
arrangement (uslovie) also duly recorded by the Velizh city magistracy.
To resolve what appeared to be an egregious case of illegal ownership of serfs
by non-nobles, local authorities first needed to determine who actually possessed
the estate and serfs in question. The paper trail of registered documents recognizing
the sale of serfs to non-nobles represented one body of evidence. When officials
questioned the peasants transferred to Lev Koronovskii from Katerina Stupishina,
all testified that the Koronovskiis were their masters and that both father and son
repeatedly reminded them of Lev’s purchase. Local parish records likewise
identified the serfs of L´vov as the property of the Koronovskiis. Finally, the
peasants of neighboring landowners, a townsman who sold liquor on the estate, and
two hired stewards confirmed that the serfs belonged to the Koronovskiis. As one
steward pointed out, Ipat Koronovskii regularly collected income and taxes from
his peasants.
Not surprisingly, the land court concluded that Ipat Koronovskii was the actual
owner of the peasants in question. But because Ipat was a townsman, his ownership
was illegal. Thus in 1819 his estate came under official supervision with its
revenues assigned to the board of social welfare. Eight years later the Senate issued
a final ruling: the land and serfs inherited by Ipat from his father belonged to the
state, and Ipat himself faced 12 weeks in prison for abusing his peasants. An
amnesty of 1826 spared him incarceration, though his former serfs were instructed
to submit a formal claim for the value of the grain and other property collected from
them. The sum would then be levied against Koronovskii. Because Ipat’s sister had
become ennobled through marriage, she was permitted to keep her serfs. The
noblewoman Katerina Stupishina, who had sold the serfs to Lev Koronovskii,
admitted committing perjury. She and the local officials who registered illegal
documents also were freed from punishment based on the 1826 amnesty. There
were no accusations of bribery arising from the case.
In the end, after untangling the violations of the Koronovskiis and others,
officials also reviewed the status of the serfs who had been sold to third parties.
Because of the complexity of the case, the Senate allowed nobles who had acquired
serfs directly or indirectly from the Koronovskiis to retain possession. Any serfs
currently in the hands of non-nobles were to be freed. Roughly 20 years before the
emancipation of Russia’s serf population, the nobility’s exclusive right to serf
ownership continued to be violated. Given that years passed before officials
unraveled the Koronovskii case, one wonders how many similar cases remained
undiscovered or unresolved. That such phenomena occurred on a wider basis seems
certain. According to one scholarly study, in the period 1835-1858, provincial-level
courts heard 20 thousand and the Senate 15,153 cases involving claims of unlawful
enserfment and illegal bondage.10
10. Steven L. Hoch and Wilson R. Augustine, “The Tax Census and the Decline of the Serf
Population in Imperial Russia,” Slavic Review, 38, 3 (September 1979): 403-25.
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Another colorful case, also the product of economic relationships, concerned an
apparent imposter who attempted to register in the townspeople of Arkhangel´sk by
identifying himself as Filipp Grigor´ev Simonov, the adopted son of a Moscow
townsman.11 In 1846 Filipp journeyed to Arkhangel´sk with a merchant employer.
At the time, he carried a passport issued by the Moscow city duma and receipts
confirming the payment of all taxes. When Filipp requested registration in the city
of Arkhangel´sk, authorities sent inquiries to their Moscow counterparts. Moscow
officials declared the man an imposter, as did his alleged adoptive mother. The
woman reported that she had lived with her son, the real Filipp Grigor´ev, who now
was married and himself a father.
The ensuing investigation exposed numerous anomalies and contradictions.
Several intermediaries had helped to formalize the identification papers of the
imposter — the Arkhangel´sk Filipp — but key witnesses had died or been drafted
into the army. Officials never definitively established the facts of the case. It is
possible that the merchant who originally employed the Arkhangel´sk Filipp had
taken advantage of an error in the Moscow city records, which listed two Filipp
Simonovs. Because of the double entry, the merchant was able to obtain a passport
for a fourteen-year-old boy of unknown origins, the present Arkhangel´sk Filipp.
The case dragged on for years, and in 1860 officials in Arkhangel´sk finally
abandoned their efforts to determine the identity of the Arkhangel´sk Filipp. They
concluded that so young a boy could not have falsified his origins deliberately. Nor,
given his documented association with the Moscow city government, could he be
regarded as a vagrant or runaway. Perhaps with some monetary encouragement
from Filipp’s merchant patron, officials allowed the imposter to register. The
archival document preserved in Moscow records that “the Arkhangel´sk society of
townspeople has declared its agreement to accept him into the townspeople of the
city of Astrakhan [sic].” It remains unclear whether the mention of Astrakhan
represents a scribal error or an effort by Arkhangel´sk officials to cover their tracks.
The above cases illustrate, and historians long have recognized, that the legally
defined categories of Russian Imperial society did not necessarily correspond to
social and economic facts. In the minds of some scholars, the gap between legal
definitions and concrete realities may raise questions about the methodological
usefulness of official categories. There are, however, several reasons why the
categories should be incorporated into any understanding of Russian society. First,
the categories had multiple usages and meanings. They were defined, applied, and
manipulated in varied and often contradictory ways both by the government and by
individuals and collectivities in society. Second, and this point deserves emphasis,
historians are not free to abandon the language of their sources. They may,
however, treat these sources as language, not as transparent reflections of reality,
and they must examine what the official categories represented in specific
historical circumstances. Regardless of empirical facts, the categories articulated
an intellectual vision, and as such, became part of the social landscape. Finally, the
11. TsGIAgM, f. 32 (Moskovskii gorodovoi magistrat), op. 1, d. 232, t. 1-4.
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categories operated primarily in the context of the official social order and of
society (obshchestvo) or local particularistic societies (obshchestva) in the formal
sense. The categories were much less relevant to the intimate sphere of social life,
though because they encompassed men, women, and children together, they also
played a role in the intimate sphere. That they were official or legal did not render
them nonsocial or nonsocietal. They were reactive, interactive, changeable, porous,
and ambiguous. They were continuously in process, and just because they served
administrative aims did not mean that they lacked social meaning. To paraphrase
Catherine II’s apocryphal remarks to Denis Diderot: lawmakers did not write on
blank paper; they wrote on human skin.12
The workings of Russian society are best understood when historians think of
the official categories as a form of social process. The conceptual plasticity of the
categories shows that they were never transparent mirrors of social life. They were
representations, perceptions, conceptualizations, and images of social life that at
once reflected, created, and were transformed by dynamics of development and
interaction in society. A person’s position in the social order constituted a bundle of
ascribed definitions and self-definitions, and the ways in which individuals and
collectivities identified themselves depended on context and contiguity. Whether
social definitions were official, societal, or personal, they were socially meaningful
only in relation to someone or something—be it the peasant village or commune,
the landlord or local official, the conscription board or district court, a subordinate
or superior, a fellow officer or soldier, a noble acquaintance or friend, a neighbor or
colleague, a teacher, relative, spouse, or child. Even if the legally defined categories
were not internalized as social consciousness, they remained fundamental to the life
chances of individuals and collectivities throughout the Imperial period.
Social Categories and Societal Integration
Because of the porosity, amorphousness, and malleability of Russia’s official social
categories, they functioned as an effective source of societal integration. In some
contexts this was an imposed integration, which then also might encourage social
conflict and resistance. In others, the categories provided mechanisms for both
formal and informal integration. It is possible to glimpse this integrative role in the
ways that society received and used the official categories. This does not mean that
the categories became internalized in the self-definitions and social identities of
12. “Monsieur Diderot, I have heard with the greatest pleasure that which your brilliant mind
has inspired in you, but with all your great principles, which I understand very well, one would
make beautiful books and bad works. You forget in all your plans of reform the difference
between our two positions; you, you only work on paper, which bears everything; it is all
smooth, supple, and opposes no obstacles, neither to your imagination nor to your pen; while I,
poor empress, I work on human skin, which is quite otherwise irritable and ticklish.” Quoted in
Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the
Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), 230.
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individuals or collectivities. It does mean, however, that in their responses to and
adaptations of legal definitions, Russian subjects appropriated the categories for
their own purposes, forcing policymakers and administrators to react to the
unforeseen consequences of societal interpretations. As numerous judicial cases
make clear, individuals and groups in society invoked the official categories,
claiming legal identities and their attendant rights, in order to survive, prosper,
resist authority, and negotiate position within the framework of the social order.
Still, what is one to make of the legal status or “rights” of Russian serfs and other
laboring people? What did “rights” amount to in an absolutist monarchy founded
on the institutionalization of human bondage? Years ago Marc Raeff described how
tsarist officials influenced by cameralist thinking sought to establish a well-ordered
state, society, and serfdom.13 Their goal of educating “citizens,” mobilizing
resources, and reforming institutions required government grounded in the rule of
laws. The rule of laws is not equivalent to the rule of law, yet throughout the
Imperial period, enlightened bureaucrats made a genuine effort to formulate and
implement just, or at least effective, laws.14 At the same time, it is important to
remember that officials frequently applied the laws in haphazard and irregular
ways. Arbitrariness resulted not only from corruption, but also from limited
experience of legal codification and from the absence of a clear distinction between
legislative, administrative, and judicial authority. Court records repeatedly show
that if justice or the fulfillment of duty required violations of the law, such
violations might be tolerated. The abstract goal of justice, however defined, took
precedence over strict adherence to the law. Indeed, “justice” frequently required
the bending of laws.
The possibility of obtaining justice based on legislative prescriptions did not,
then, eliminate arbitrariness or abuse. It did, however, define a moral standard that
legitimized and encouraged popular action. Despite unpredictable and statistically
meager results, Russian subjects repeatedly appealed to the image of the good and
merciful tsar in the hopes of achieving redress for grievances. If individuals did not
actually believe in the tsarist principle, they nevertheless used it in practical ways to
demand just amends. This was not due to so-called “naïve monarchism” or to a
“myth of the tsar.” It resulted from the simple fact that final judicial and legislative
authority lay in the hands of the ruler. The monarch was bound to obey the laws,
though prior to the creation of the Duma in 1906, he or she also could change the
laws at will. For almost the entire Imperial period, no administrative ruling or
statute became law without first receiving the monarch’s “so be it.” In addition, the
sovereign could at any moment overrule any and all legal-administrative decisions
emanating from any state or societal institution. In the name of justice and mercy,
monarchs intervened in the routine operations of government, and outside regular
13. Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law
in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1983).
14. By referring to the “rule of laws,” as opposed to the “rule of law,” I hope to convey the
distinctiveness of the Russian case (in Europe) without, however, suggesting that the empire
was lawless or its officials and subjects devoid of legal-mindedness.
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bureaucratic channels, they responded to the petitions of individual subjects and
communities. No matter how absolutist the institutions of the monarchy remained,
the art of governance — the need to project legitimate state power — produced
ongoing “dialogue” with the Russian people.
The dialogue between the Russian monarchy and the people, the monarch’s
subjects, assumed a variety of forms. Given the absence in Russia of constituted
bodies, codified feudal contracts, and time-honored legal rights, this dialogue is
best understood as a moral one. Already in Muscovite times and continuing until
1917, the Russian monarchy consulted representatives of social groups, local
communities, and central institutions on an ad hoc basis, in times of national
emergency and in preparation for major reforms and legislative initiatives. Before
1906, society’s voice was not formalized or institutionalized on any permanent
translocal basis, but consultation was practiced. Equally significant, because
ordinary people were able to manipulate legal prescriptions for personal gain, they
too played a role in the “legislative process.” Repeatedly, policymakers issued new
laws in response to popular interpretations of legal formulas. This dynamic is
clearly visible in military judicial records and in the legislation governing peasant
lawsuits on grounds of illegal enserfment.
Technological and institutional obstacles to the implementation of legislative
enactments also defined interactions between the monarchy and the people. Limits
to the effective exercise of state power left enormous discretionary authority in the
hands of landowners, military commanders, and local officials. Although
discretionary authority could be arbitrary and corrupt, the wide latitude given to
local communities also promoted societal integration by granting a measure of
autonomy to social groups. Again, in the absence of constituted bodies such as
guilds, diets, parlements, provincial estates, estates general, or the English
parliament — bodies that linked the localities to each other and to the state —
authority relationships tended to operate on a local, informal, and personalized
basis. Unlike their English or French counterparts, who appropriated locally
constituted bodies in order to extend monarchical power, Russia’s rulers had no
such bodies to appropriate. Within the confines of Russian absolutism, state power
remained remote and relatively easy to evade. Institutional fragmentation and
ineffective administration brought de facto “freedom.”
But freedom by default is not equivalent to limited monarchy or politically
organized civil society, two mainstays of modern democratic development in
Europe. The institutionally fragmented Russian monarchy was built upon a
similarly fragmented Russian “society” — a society that before the early
twentieth century possessed no translocal authority or representation. The legally
defined categories or identities of Russian Imperial society (and of Imperial
society more broadly) functioned as tools of administrative control and
governance: they defined formal rights and obligations — for example, tax and
service obligations — as well as lawful economic opportunities and access to
education and the rewards of service. They also represented social tools that
people could appropriate and manipulate as they struggled to negotiate authority
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and survive economically. Social meaningfulness did not require that people
internalize the categories as social consciousness. Nor did it require that the
categories be the product of societal initiative. Whichever self-definitions people
chose, and they chose differently in different situations, the legal categories
represented an important dimension of social life. For most of the Imperial
period, these identities provided the only continual and comprehensive evidence
of how educated Russians conceptualized their society. Such conceptualizations
then served as a basis for policymaking and social action. In addition, because
ordinary people could employ tsarist laws for their own purposes, their use of
official social categories, like their use of the courts and the idea of the good tsar,
integrated them into the Imperial polity.
When the plasticity of official social categories encouraged accommodation and
adaptation, legal ambiguity created opportunity. But legal ambiguity also produced
uncertainty, instability, and societal fragmentation. For this reason, it is difficult to
conclude that in the post-emancipation period, economic modernization, mass
education, or intensified geographic and social mobility undermined the stable
social bonds and identities of “traditional” society. Russian society was
traditionally fragmented, and the “traditional” identities that according to some
historical accounts appeared to be crumbling had in fact never been firmly
established. Nor were the “moral economies” and “everyday forms of resistance”
of late Imperial peasants, workers, or soldiers fundamentally different from those
that existed prior to the Great Reforms. This is illustrated by popular uprisings,
soldiers’ complaints against officers, peasant lawsuits seeking emancipation, and
the still virtually unstudied relationship between state demands, community
practices or customs, and statute law. Without pressing the point, it can be noted
that the social foundations of the Russian Revolution(s) had as much to do with
already weak institutions as with new social fissures.
Social Categories and Social Insecurity
At the same time that social amorphousness promoted societal integration by
allowing people to elude administrative controls and reinvent their identities in
creative and profitable ways, it also produced widespread insecurity. This is
nowhere more evident than in the status of the empire’s most privileged social
group, the nobility. Throughout the Imperial period, Russia’s landowning and
service elites remained legally and, with significant exceptions, economically
vulnerable. Ennoblement occurred only through service (except for women, who
could achieve ennoblement through marriage), and noble rights, even when
hereditary, were defined and at any moment could be changed by the monarch’s
decree. Unlike the aristocracies and nobilities of England, France, the German
states, and the empire’s own Baltic provinces, Russian nobles lacked proprietary
claims to authority beyond the family estate — claims that were historically
articulated and politically constituted in the local laws, offices, and institutions of
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an identifiable territory. Not even the legal identity of Russian nobles could always
be ascertained. In the early eighteenth century, unrequited claimants to noble status
found themselves inscribed in poll tax registers, the primary marker of lower-class
status, and a century later, noble claimants still might be denied access to service
with noble rights. Adding to the uncertainties of definition, ambitious and clever
commoners falsified identities and illicitly assumed the attributes of nobility. These
conditions are difficult to measure, but as late as 1767, both the Heraldry Office and
the Senate complained about the absence of a complete register of nobles and
requested an exact definition of whether the qualifications for nobility should be
service rank, possession of an estate, or both.15
The social characteristics of the nobility were similarly ambiguous. The reforms
of Peter the Great added a cultural component to noble identity by imposing
European education and forms of sociability on elite courtiers and servicemen. Even
so, landed nobles of exalted lineage sometimes remained poor, uneducated, and
steeped in custom. In Sergei Aksakov’s novel A Russian Gentleman, the family of
Sophia represents the post-Petrine urban, bureaucratic nobility. Based on education
and the possession of European culture, Sophia regards her background as superior to
that of many lineal nobles.16 Indeed, although her husband’s ancestors are of ancient
and honored lineage, her father-in-law, the patriarch Bagrov, and his married
daughters live in a manner barely distinguishable from that of peasants. Genealogies
notwithstanding, Sophia’s father, a parvenu noble, questions whether or not the
Bagrovs, given their ignorance and boorishness, offer a suitable match for his
sophisticated daughter. The marriage illustrates how Western/European culture, both
spiritual and material, compensated for, and in the eyes of some took precedence
over, lineage and wealth.
The association of social status with culture was particularly striking in the
development of the intelligentsia and a self-consciously independent society, two
sociocultural categories that overlapped with the nobility. By the mid-eighteenth
century, Russia possessed a socially mixed, enlightened reading and writing public
that distinguished itself from corrupt courtiers and uncultivated groups in society.
In the early nineteenth century, educated people identified with the concept of a
polite society, also separate from the monarchy and state, which they defined in
terms of moral autonomy, European culture, and refined sociability. By 1861 the
collective concept of the intelligentsia, known for its ethos of service to the people,
entered the empire’s social vocabulary. In these and other examples, educated
Russians engaged in an ongoing search for meaningful social ties by
conceptualizing sociocultural collectivities beyond kinship, immediate
community, and official society. Through identification with the “honorable
public” (publika), “civil society of the educated” (obshchestvo), the intelligentsia,
and later the nation or the people (narod), educated Russians articulated identities
15. Wirtschafter, Social Identity, 29-32
16. S.T. Aksakov, A Russian Gentleman, trans. J.D. Duff (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1982).
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that conveyed a sense of social belonging without, however, attaining an
independent institutional existence. Only in the later nineteenth century did the
self-proclaimed sociocultural identities of Russia’s educated elites acquire firm
institutional moorings. Only then did their prepolitical discursive ideal become a
nascent civil society.
Questions of the public, the public sphere, and civil society have captivated
social and cultural historians for the past several decades. The existence of a public
sphere and/or civil society has been widely recognized as an essential element of
liberal democratic development in modern Europe. In nineteenth-century Russia,
despite a rich network of voluntary associations, the persistence of police
repression and absolutist monarchy clearly impeded the formation of a politically
organized civil society. But while such impediments are significant, they cannot
explain why Russia’s educated and professional classes disintegrated into internal
crisis and conflict at the very moment when the revolution of 1905 allowed them
relatively free association. In the realms of economic activity (some of it illegal),
local self-government, philanthropy, cultural creativity, and even professional
services, the roots of Russian civil society seemed viable and broadly rooted from
at least the mid-nineteenth century.17 Still, this “civil society” failed to cohere and
sustain a translocal presence in the political public sphere. Instead, until the period
of the Duma monarchy (1906-1917), it remained the stuff of private, personalized,
and localized relationships.
Given the lack of formal institutionalization in Russian social and political
life — again the absence of translocal constituted bodies proved crucial — it was
not evolving social institutions that rendered society into a whole and bound it to
government. Rather, the cement of society emerged from judicial process, legally
defined social categories, the Orthodox religion, and increasingly, Russian
literature and culture. Because the institutions of central government barely
reached beyond provincial and district capitals, extensive informal autonomy
remained in the hands of local communities. This informal autonomy is particularly
important for understanding how the Imperial polity functioned over the long
duration. Ultimately, however, it was the lack of formal institutionalization and the
weak linkages between the center and localities that accounted for the deep social
crisis and ideological voluntarism of the revolutionary era. In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, a politically organized civil society finally emerged,
at the same time that the cumulative effects of resource mobilization, universal
conscription, and more than two centuries of state building brought growing
numbers of Imperial subjects into direct contact with governmental authority. In
these conditions of unprecedented societal assertiveness and mounting bureaucratic
17. For recent treatments, see Joseph Bradley, Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia:
Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009); B. Pietrow-
Ennker and G.N. Ul´ianova, eds., Grazhdanskaia identichnost´ i sfera grazhdanskoi
deiatel´nosti v Rossiiskoi imperii: Vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX veka [Civic Identity and
the Sphere of Civic Activity in the Russian Empire: Second Half of the Nineteenth-Beginning
of the Twentieth Century], (M., 2007).
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intrusions into everyday life, the gap between the idea and reality of tsarist rule
became increasingly apparent. Not surprisingly, belief in a beneficent monarch
steadily eroded.
Conclusion
Attention to the amorphousness of Russia’s legally defined social categories
suggests a possible solution to the problem of the historian’s social vocabulary.
The amorphousness indicates that the languages of soslovie and class both are
needed, depending of course on concrete circumstances. The social crisis of late
Imperial Russia cannot be explained with reference to a succession or layering of
distinct social formations such as the transition from pre-modern/legal sosloviia
to modern/economic classes. Ranks, sosloviia, and classes all held meaning and
all played a role in the ordering of Russian society throughout the Imperial
period. One must add, moreover, to the list of social “formations” entities such as
the patriarchal household, the parish or church community, and the sociocultural
identities associated with obshchestvo, the intelligentsia, and the narod. Each of
these categories illuminates specific social relationships and patterns of
development. That one type of category formed or functioned at a given moment
did not require that another type be superseded or disappear. The same can be said
of the chronological divides employed by historians. Like social categories,
chronological divides are needed, if scholars are to discuss events and people in
specific historical settings. But chronological distinctions also can be arbitrary
and variable, depending on circumstances and the subject in view. That great
divide of Russian Imperial history, the 1861 emancipation of the serfs,
represented both a dramatic break on the model of 1789 (except that Russia’s old
regime lasted until 1905) and the initiation of an emancipation process that absent
war and revolution would have continued well into the twentieth century. Social
categories and chronological divides are necessary tools of analysis and
communication, but they are not equivalent to concrete historical facts.
Is it, then, inevitable that the legal-administrative record of the tsarist
bureaucracy will produce nothing more than a statist or official understanding of
Russian social history? Historians can know only that which their sources make
knowable, and people who do not express themselves in writing reveal only so
much. Baffled by the limits of social history, particularly its rigorous standard of
evidence, scholars began in the 1980s to move into the more supple arena of
cultural history, a subfield influenced less by sociology and economics and more by
anthropology and literary criticism. As cultural historians, scholars continued their
search for social consciousness, now labeled discourse analysis, subaltern studies,
popular culture, the history of mentality, or the history of everyday life. Through
the study of events and cultural artifacts as “representations” or narratives that can
be “read” in multiple and creative ways, historians sought to reconstruct the
mentality of individuals and the mores of social collectivities by uncovering the
231_250_Wirtschfter_Mr50_1.fm  Page 248  Vendredi, 5. mars 2010  10:14 10
SOCIAL CATEGORIES IN RUSSIAN IMPERIAL HISTORY 249
symbolic meaning(s) of human actions.18 But here too, as in the archives, the
Russian sources refused to replicate social consciousness. Once again, subjective
thoughts and feelings remained inaccessible. As a result, it became necessary to
think in terms of public as opposed to private personhood and to focus on the
cognitive question of how people reconciled the idea of society with the reality of
social experience. Once again, the history of modern Russian society could not be
understood without reference to the history of conceptualizing that society.
The conceptualization of Russian society can be traced through successive
generations of intellectuals and rulers. From the time of Peter the Great to the era of
Gorbachev, and including the reigns of Catherine the Great and Alexander II, as
well as the dictatorships of Lenin and Stalin—Russia’s rulers have consciously and
often with great violence pursued plans to remake society in accordance with
cameralist, Enlightenment, or Marxist principles. Following decades of research
devoted to legally defined social categories, historians have learned much about the
conceptualization of that society. Through their efforts, it has become clear that in
order to understand the structure(s) of a society, it is necessary to examine the
language, categories, and concepts employed by contemporaries to describe
themselves and their surroundings. Indeed, even if the self-representations of
individuals and communities are less objectively accurate than the statistical
methods and “scientific” accounts of present-day researchers, they still bear a
closer relationship to the behavior, actions, and attitudes of actual historical actors.
More often than not, in real historical time, their representations and
(mis)understandings constituted the basis for individual and group responses to
concrete conditions.
Let the record be clear. To analyze the relationship between social concepts and
social realities is not to understand social consciousness. Still, one can take comfort
in the realization that what people say and do in public, as opposed to what they
really think and feel, is the more crucial factor for explaining how a society and
polity function. One can take added comfort in the popular adage that “history
repeats itself,” despite the well nigh universal condemnation of this notion among
professional historians. Historians rightly seek to avoid deterministic and reductive
thinking, but their empiricist orientation should not obscure the substantive
meaning of “history repeats itself.” The cliché suggests that history as a mode of
inquiry does more than attempt to understand the past: it leads to the deeper
question of “what is there in me that allows me to understand them?” With this
18. E. Wirtschafter, The Play of Ideas in Russian Enlightenment Theater (DeKalb: Northern
Illinois Univ. Press, 2003); Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in
Russian Monarchy, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995 and 2000);
E.N. Marasinova, Psikhologiia elity rossiiskogo dvorianstva poslednei treti XVIII veka (Po
materialam perepiski) [Psychology of the Elite of the Russian Nobility in the Last Third of the
Eighteenth Century (Based on Correspondence)] (M.: Rosspen, 1999); Andrei Zorin, Kormia
dvuglavogo orla… Literatura i gosudarstvennaia ideologiia v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII-
pervoi treti XIX veka [Feeding the Two-Headed Eagle... Literature and State Ideology in
Russia in the Last Third of the Eighteenth-First Third of the Nineteenth Century] (M.: Novoe
Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2001).
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question history does not simply assess but directly confronts the past by requiring
its practitioners and readers to ask of themselves “where would I have been?” By
confronting the past, ideally on its own terms, we in fact confront our own moral
universe in order to understand where we stand and where we hope to go. In this
sense history repeats itself, and the search for social consciousness becomes the
search for ourselves.
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